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Abstract. We present work in progress
3 on a method for the engineering, val-
idation and veriﬁcation of generic requirements using domain engineering and
formal methods. The need to develop a generic requirement set for subsequent
system instantiation is complicated by the addition of the high levels of veriﬁca-
tion demanded by safety-critical domains such as avionics. Our chosen applica-
tion domain is the failure detection and management function for engine control
systems: here generic requirements drive a software product line of target sys-
tems.
A pilot formal speciﬁcation and design exercise is undertaken on a small (two-
sensor) system element. This exercise has a number of aims: to support the do-
main analysis, to gain a view of appropriate design abstractions, for a B novice to
gain experience in the B method and tools, and to evaluate the usability and utility
of that method. We also present a prototype method for the production and veriﬁ-
cation of a generic requirement set in our UML-based formal notation, UML-B,
and tooling developed in support. The formal veriﬁcation both of the structural
generic requirement set, and of a particular application, is achieved via translation
to the formal speciﬁcation language, B, using our U2B and ProB tools.
1 Introduction
The need for generic approaches to support reuse in systems engineering is well known;
in the avionics industry, for example, [16, 11] describe the reuse of generic sets of re-
quirements in engine control and ﬂight control systems. The need for reuse arises in
many contexts, such as in system evolution, adaptation, or component-based construc-
tion. In this paper we are concerned with formal, generic requirements engineering to
address the need for software product lines in the failure management domain in avion-
ics.
Asoftwareproductline (SPL)is a collection of variantimplementations of a generic
software requirement speciﬁcation, to meet a variety of platform, environmental, func-
tional, or other requirements. In avionics, the generic requirement speciﬁcation for an
3 This work is part of the EU funded research project IST 511599 - RODIN (Rigorous Open
Development Environment for Complex Systems).engine control system is implemented in a different variant in each manufacturer air-
frame; [Op.Cit.] describe SPL solutions. The notion of software product line engineer-
ing became well established [18], after Parnas’ prescient proposal [22] in the 70’s.
Domain analysis and object oriented frameworks are among numerous vehicles
proposed to support product line development. In Domain-Speciﬁc Software Architec-
ture [29] for example, the production of a set of generic, domain-speciﬁc requirements
through domain engineering is followed by its successive reﬁnement, in a series of sys-
tem engineering cycles, into speciﬁc product instance requirements. On the other hand
[12] describes the Object-Oriented Framework as “a reusable, semi-complete appli-
cation that can be specialized to produce custom applications”. Here the domain engi-
neering produces an object-oriented model that must be instantiated, in some systematic
way, for each speciﬁc product required. In this work we combine object-oriented and
formal techniques and tools in the domain analysis and engineering of generic require-
ments.
It is widely recognized that formal methods (FM) technology makes a strong con-
tribution to the veriﬁcation required for safety-critical systems [19]. It is further recog-
nized that FM will need to be integrated [3] in as “black-box” as possible a manner in
order to achieve serious industry penetration. The B method of J.-R. Abrial [1, 23] is
a formal method with good tool support [2, 9] and a good industrial track record, e.g.
[10]. At Southampton, we have for some years been developing an approach of inte-
grating formal speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation in B, with the UML [8]. The UML-B [26]
is a specialisation of UML that deﬁnes a formal modelling notation combining UML
and B. It is supported by the U2B tool [24], which translates UML-B models into B,
for subsequent formal veriﬁcation. This veriﬁcation includes model-checking with the
ProB model-checker [17] for B. These tools have all been developed at Southampton,
and continue to be extended in current work.
1.1 Failure detection and management for engine control
A common functionality required of many systems is to detect and manage the failure
of its inputs. This is particularly pertinent in aviation applications where lack of tol-
erance to failed system inputs could have severe consequences. The failure manager
ﬁlters inputs from the controlled system, providing the best information possible and
determining whether a transducer or system component has failed or not.
Inputs may be tested for magnitude, rate of change and consistency with other in-
puts. When a failure is detected it is managed in order to maintain a usable set of input
values for the control subsystem and provide ‘graceful degradation’. To prevent over-
reaction to isolated transient values, a failed condition must be conﬁrmed as persistent
before irreversible action is taken. Failure detection and management (FDM) in engine
control systems is a demanding application area, see e.g. [7], giving rise to far more
than a simple parameterizable product line situation.
Ourapproachcontributestothefailuredetectionandmanagementdomainbypropos-
ing a method for the engineering, validation and veriﬁcation of generic requirements for
product-line engineering purposes. The approach exploits genericity both within as well
as between target system variants. Although product-line engineering has been applied
in engine and ﬂight control systems [16, 11], we are not aware of any such work in theFDM domain. We deﬁne generic classes of failure-detection test for sensors and vari-
ables in the system environment, such as rate-of-change, limit, and multiple-redundant-
sensor, which are simply instantiated by parameter. Multiple instances of these classes
occur in any given system. Failure conﬁrmation is then a generic abstraction over these
test classes: it constitutes a conﬁgurable process of execution of speciﬁed tests over a
number of system cycles, that will determine whether a failure of the component under
test has occurred. Our approach is focussed on the genericity of this highly variable
process.
1.2 Fault Tolerance
This application domain (and our approach to it) includes fault tolerant design in two
senses: tolerance to faults in the environment, and in the control system itself. The FDM
application is precisely about maximizing tolerance to faults in the sensed engine and
airframe environment. The control system (including the FDM function) is supported
by a backup control system in a dynamically redundant design. This backup system
with dissimilar hardware/software design, with a reduced-functionality sensing ﬁt can
be switched in by a watchdog mechanism if the main system has failed.
In the narrower (and more usual) sense, we will be examining various schemes for
designing fault tolerance into the FDM software subsystem. Work to date has speciﬁed
and validated a generic requirements speciﬁcation for FDM. As we apply reﬁnement
techniques and technology to construct the design, we will consider various relevant
approaches, such as driving the speciﬁcation of a control system from environmental
requirements [13], or the use of fault-tolerant patterns for B speciﬁcations [14] and
their reﬁnements [15].
1.3 The paper
We present the results of a pilot formal speciﬁcation and design exercise. This was un-
dertaken on a small (two-sensor) element of a typical system from our partner ATEC’s
domain. This exercise was intended to support the domain analysis, and to gain a view
of appropriate design abstractions for the full exercise of developing and validating
the generic requirements. Furthermore, since the ATEC engineer (and co-author of this
paper) was a novice to the B method, the exercise would also enable him to gain expe-
rience in the B method and tools, and to evaluate the usability and utility of that method
to an engineer in the target domain.
The pilot exercise took place in the context of our development of a prototype
method for the speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation of generic requirements sets for systems
of this type. The method is brieﬂy presented here; for a fuller discussion see [27, 28].
We also report brieﬂy on tooling subsequently developed to support the method.
The paper proceeds as follows. The pilot study and its evaluation is presented in
section 2. Sections 3 and 4 review our prototype method and our domain analysis activ-
ity. Section 5 describes the domain engineering of the generic model, followed by the
engineering of a sample application instance in section 6. A brief taxonomy of valida-
tion/veriﬁcation problems is then presented in section 7. Section 8 concludes.2 Pilot study
To explore the FDM domain in more detail we carried out a pilot study that modeled
and veriﬁed in B a very small example consisting of two sensors used to measure one
environment variable. The aim of the pilot study was to gain a better understanding of
the stages and processes involved, before embarking on the search for generic re-usable
modeling abstractions. The pilot study was carried out by our co-author, an engineer
with our industrial partner company, who provided the domain expertise. Since he was
a novice to formal speciﬁcation and the B method, the pilot study also provided insight
into the reaction we might expect from industrial users that adopt our method. Thus
a secondary aim was to evaluate model development using B and the existing B tools
from the point of view of adoption in an industrial setting.
The model was intended to be both analytical and speciﬁcational, i.e. the aim was
to explore the requirements as well as develop a speciﬁcation. The dual redundant en-
gine speed (ES) functionality was selected as it includes behaviour representative of
other control inputs and includes interaction between sensors. The ES value is normally
taken from the ESa input but if this is not healthy, the ESb input is used instead. If both
inputs are unhealthy the ES signal is not updated. The ES failure management require-
ments include input magnitude tests, comparative (difference) tests between two given
inputs, and conﬁrmation mechanisms that select appropriate output values and failure
ﬂag settings.
2.1 Approach
The engineer initially explored the requirements by developing the model as a series
of speciﬁcations adding functionality and validating new behaviour in stages using the
ProB animation tool. The stages were ‘idealisations’ rather than true abstractions be-
cause they omitted to allow for the effects of events added in later stages. Hence they
give only an approximate indication of behaviour corresponding to that obtained by ig-
noring some of the details to be added later. (Analogous to idealisation in physics, such
as ideal gases, where some phenomena that affect the system are simply ignored even
if they effect the the variables of the model). This approach, although less rigorous than
reﬁnement, was chosen as it allowed a quick exploration of the requirements by avoid-
ingthedifﬁcultprocessofﬁndingusefulabstractionsandprovingtheirreﬁnements.The
ProB model checker was used to check internal consistency within the requirements at
each stage.
The next stage was to revise the speciﬁcations to achieve reﬁnement consistency.
The ProB model checker [17] and the prover tool Click’N’Prove/B4free [9] were used
to verify the reﬁnements. A ﬁnal stage to reﬁne the model towards code implementation
is ongoing.
To obtain a reﬁnement chain, sufﬁcient abstract detail was added to the idealised
speciﬁcation to satisfy the proof obligations. In practice this meant that, when adding
newevents,theabstractversionsinpreviouslevelswerenotskip,butnon-deterministic
alterations to variables at that level. Informally, this is a generalisation of event reﬁne-
ment where the effect of new events is, in a loose sense, not signiﬁcant to the old vari-
ables. It is interesting to note that a proven reﬁnement chain can be constructed in thismanner with little experience, using the proof obligations as a guide to ﬁnd the weakest
appropriate abstraction. However, the constructed reﬁnement chain is only useful if it is
used in some way to validate the reﬁnements. Hence the abstract level was reconsidered
to ensure that the effect of the new events on the old variables is acceptable and does
not invalidate the model.
Hence,theapproachutilisesidealisation(whichseemstobeeasierthanabstraction),
superimposing detail (which is easy because it is not required to reﬁne anything) and
‘upwards’ addition of suitable detail to obtain reﬁnement (which is fairly easy because
it is led by the proof tools). We present a sanitized version of the ﬁnal speciﬁcations
with notes to explain the initial intentions from which they derived.
2.2 Abstract Model
The most abstract speciﬁcation is shown below in machine Engine speed 0. The
intention of this stage was to represent the functionality as a ‘black box’ that allows
given output combinations as a result of under-speciﬁed environment changes. The only
constraint is that the outputs have some interlocking relationships. For example, if a
ﬂag indicates that the ESa signal healthy action was taken, then the output should be
equal to the ESa sensor value until the environment changes the ESa sensor value. The
idealisation is that the output is only the same as a snapshot reading of the sensor value.
In later reﬁnements we would like to introduce the read value of the sensor and specify
that the output is equal to this.
Two sensors, esa and esb are deﬁned. Each sensor has a change event which al-
ters the sensor value non-deterministically. Each sensor has a ﬂag which is set (by the
outcome operations) to record when it has failed. There are four alternative outcome
events corresponding to the health or failure combinations of the two sensors (e.g. hh
is the outcome taken when both esa and esb are healthy). These outcomes take the
appropriate failure action by setting the output to either esa, esb or its previous value.
In this stage, the selection of the appropriate outcome, from those available, is left to
chance and not related to the input values in any way. Initially all 4 outcomes are avail-
able but, since failed sensors are not allowed to recover, hh will be disabled thereafter if
either of the sensors is subjected to a failing outcome. This ‘latching out’ of a possible
outcome is represented by the latch ﬂags esalatch and esblatch. Eventually only
the ff outcome will be available. An invariant speciﬁes the alternative properties that
should be achieved on the output in terms of the sensor values (until the environment
changes the sensor values again).
MACHINE Engine speed 0
...
INVARIANT ... &
(newVal = TRUE or
(esalatch = UNSET & output = esavalue) or
(esblatch = UNSET & output = esbvalue) or
output = previous)
OPERATIONS /*EVENTS*/
esaChange =
BEGIN
esavalue :: NATURAL || newVal := TRUE
END;hh =
SELECT
esalatch = UNSET & esblatch = UNSET
THEN
output , previous := esavalue, esavalue ||
newVal := FALSE
END;
...
ff =
BEGIN
output := previous ||
esalatch, esblatch := SET, SET ||
newVal := FALSE
END
2.3 First Reﬁnement
In the ﬁrst reﬁnement of this abstract model more detail is added by introducing the
events, esavalidate and esbvalidate. These events are responsible for deter-
mining which of the alternative outcomes will be taken. They do this by setting the
esaresult and esbresult ﬂags, which are now used in the guards of the outcome
events. The guards of the outcome events are also strengthed to ensure that both esa
and esb sensors have been newly validated before the outcome is taken. The means
by which validate decides which outcome to activate remains underspeciﬁed. This
is a valid reﬁnement because the outcome event guards are strengthened and new data
(result) is superimposed. However, the speciﬁcation of validation is idealised because
it omits the difference test which, in the next reﬁnement, is added as a new event that
also modiﬁes the variable esbresult. To satisfy the prover and achieve the next re-
ﬁnement we later revisit this stage to de-idealise it by adding an abstract version of the
difftest event that non-deterministically alters esaresult and esbresult.
This reﬁnement stage led to consideration of what types and level of failure de-
tection should be addressed and whether they should indicate different actions. The
ordering of the sequence of events from failure detections to actions was considered.
The reﬁnement raised the issue of test scheduling and input sampling and whether a se-
ries of tests could easily be accommodated in the design by an appropriate sequencing
mechanism
REFINEMENT Engine speed 1
REFINES Engine speed 0
...
;
esavalidate =
SELECT
esavalidated=FALSE
THEN
esaresult :: PASS FAIL ||
esavalidated := TRUE
END
;
hh =
SELECT
esavalidated = TRUE & esbvalidated = TRUE &
esaresult = PASS & esbresult = PASS &
esalatch = UNSET & esblatch = UNSET &
THEN
esavalidated, esbvalidated := FALSE, FALSE ||
output, previous := esavalue, esavalue ||
newVal := FALSE
END;hf =
SELECT
esavalidated = TRUE & esbvalidated = TRUE &
esaresult = PASS & esbresult = FAIL &
esalatch = UNSET
THEN
esavalidated, esbvalidated := FALSE, FALSE ||
output, previous := esavalue, esavalue ||
esblatch := SET ||
newVal := FALSE
END;
...
2.4 Second and third Reﬁnements
Inthesecondreﬁnement,aneweventthatcanalsoaffecttheselectedoutcome,isadded.
This event, difftest, represents a comparison between the two sensor values. It
must happen after both esa and esb have been validated and before an outcome event
occurs. Note that it can only change sensor results from pass to fail not vice versa.
Again the mechanism by which it decides this is left under-speciﬁed.
difftest =
SELECT
esavalidated = TRUE & esbvalidated = TRUE &
esdiffvalidated = FALSE
THEN
IF esaresult = PASS & esbresult = PASS
THEN esbresult :: PASS FAIL
END ||
esdiffvalidated := TRUE
END;
Since this stage added a new event that alters a variable (esbresult) introduced
in the previous reﬁnement stage, an abstract version of this event must be added to
the ﬁrst reﬁnement to allow the second reﬁnement to be a reﬁnement of the ﬁrst. The
most abstract version of the event would be a simple non-deterministic assignment of
the variable to any value from its type (esbresult :: PASS FAIL). However, al-
though this would ensure the reﬁnement, it would be a pointless exercise since the
previous level would no longer describe a desired behaviour. That is, the difftest
event could unlatch some failure results which is one of the main features that were
embodied in the abstract level. A slightly more constrained abstract version is obtained
by also retaining any conjuncts from guards or conditions that are based on variables in
the previous level. This restricts the effect of the event in a way that corresponds with
the reﬁnement. Hence it stands a better chance of being an acceptable speciﬁcation
for the reﬁnement. Its consistency and validity can then be examined using the ProB
model checker and animator. In our case, this method produced abstract speciﬁcations
that were consistent with the existing invariants and valid but we are not convinced that
this will always be the case. It may be necessary to reconsider the way the feature is
introduced if the abstract model does not behave as desired or violates the invariant.
difftest =
SELECT
esavalidated = TRUE & esbvalidated = TRUE
THEN
IF esaresult = PASS & esbresult = PASS
THEN esbresult :: PASS FAILEND
END;
Similarly, the previous level abstract model must have an even more abstract version
of the new difftest event added to it. This is obtained by a similar process, retaining
only the guards, conditions and non-deterministic versions of assignments that utilise
variables in the abstract speciﬁcation.
difftest =
IF esaresult = PASS & esbresult = PASS
THEN esbresult :: PASS FAIL
END;
In the third reﬁnement, the details of how validate and difftest set result
(and hence select an outcome) is provided. This entails comparing the sensor value
against ﬁxed limits and against each other. A conﬁrmation counter mechanism was
also introduced to model the requirement to not be oversensitive to sensor noise. This
entailed adding a third, intermediate state FAILING to the possible values of result
with corresponding new outcome events. The reﬁnement was proven by adding a gluing
invariant to match the states with the abstract version.
2.5 Evaluation
The pilot study was carried out and proven in B and the reﬁnement chain was fully
proven by automatic proof. Since choosing useful abstractions and appropriate reﬁne-
ments is difﬁcult, requiring considerable experience and understanding of the reﬁne-
ment process, it surprised us that the novice engineer was able to achieve this, even
for the simple example. To complicate matters, an event style of B (used in the Rodin
project) was used but proof had to be achieved using the existing proof tools which are
not event B based. For example, if a new event is added at a reﬁnement, an abstract
version of the event, with body skip (i.e. do nothing) must be added to all previous
levels. The prover was able to automatically prove all of the proof obligations when
the speciﬁcations were correct. This meant that the interactive prover was only used to
identify corrections to the speciﬁcations.
The ease of proof was due to two factors. Firstly, only simple data types were used.
We tried rewriting the speciﬁcations using a set of sensors with two elements esa
and esb and relations from this set for the sensor data. With this data representation,
the prover was no longer able to complete automatically. The almost exclusive use of
superposition reﬁnement (i.e. lack of data reﬁnement) also probably assisted the prover.
The engineer recognised that it was difﬁcult to ﬁnd early abstract models that al-
lowed for future reﬁnements. The modeller’s perception of what is important may
change through experience with the model and understanding of the domain. The pro-
cess is therefore iterative in nature. The novice engineer found the animation facility
of the ProB tool particularly useful to quickly validate and explore model behaviour.
He recognised that in larger scale problems the use of invariant checking with the tools
will be an invaluable aid to veriﬁcation and validation where it may be quite onerous
to exercise the equivalent assurance using other methods. However the effectiveness ofinvariants in models relies on how well they can be created and it was recognised that
weak or incorrect invariants can be generated by lack of experience, which may be a
hindrance to development and veriﬁcation.
The syntax of the B notation did not present signiﬁcant difﬁculties in this develop-
ment as functionality could be expressed using simple constructs. Most proof obliga-
tions were discharged automatically. Where they were not, the proof goals were used to
identify where the speciﬁcations need to be corrected or enhanced to achieve automatic
proof.
The pilot study provided a better understanding of several issues in the FDM do-
main. In particular, a better understanding of the reaction between sensor values, tests
and outcomes was gained.
3 Methodology
The process for obtaining a generic model of requirements is illustrated in Fig. 1. The
ﬁrst stage is an informal domain analysis which is based on prior experience of de-
veloping products for the application domain of failure detection and management in
engine control. A taxonomy of generic requirements found in the application domain is
developed. For example, class INP includes generic requirements INP2, INP5 and their
sample instances below:
INP2
The subsystem input variables represent either sensor values or
other subsystem variables.
INP5 Some “other subsystem” input variables represent the controller
state.
Ref Name Type Range Res Description Freq
INP2.5 ET5 digitised -200 to 2000F 0.1F Engine Temp. sensor 5 24
INP2.10 ESa digitised 0-200 % 0.01 Engine Speed (main) 24
INP5.1 CYCLE NO digital 1..16 1 Execution cycle counter 24
The instance requirements in each generic requirement class are thus expressed
as data in tabular form. Thus a ﬁrst-cut generic entity-relationship model can be con-
structed by relating these generic requirement entities, or classes. This generic model is
represented as a UML-B class diagram, and a corresponding B speciﬁcation is gener-
ated.
The identiﬁcation of a useful generic model is a difﬁcult process warranting fur-
ther exploration. This is done in the domain engineering stage where a more rigorous
examination of the ﬁrst-cut model is undertaken, using UML-B, U2B and ProB. The
model is animated by creating typical instances of its generic requirement classes, to
test when it is and is not consistent. This stage is model validation by animation, using
the ProB and U2B tools, to show that it is capable of holding the kind of information
that is found in the application domain. During this stage the relationships between the
classes are likely to be adjusted as a better understanding of the domain is developed.
This stage results in a validated generic model of requirements that can be instantiated
for each new application.domain analysis domain 
engineering
verify key 
issues
previous product 
experience
first-cut generic 
model
validated generic 
model
key-issues abstract 
model
final verified generic 
model
Fig.1. Process for obtaining the generic model
For each new application instance, the generic requirement classes are instantiated
from product instance data, producing an instance model. The relationship between
the generic and the instance model is analogous to that between a class and and ob-
ject model in UML. Instantiation is done by our prototype Requirements Manager tool,
which reads instance requirement data from a database (see sec. 6), and uses that data
to instantiate the generic UML-B model. The ProB model checker is then used to au-
tomatically verify that the instantiated application is consistent with the relationship
constraints embodied in the generic model. This stage, producing a consistent instance
model, shows that the requirements are a consistent set of requirements for the domain.
It does not, however, show that they are the right set of requirements that will give the
desired system behaviour.
Our aim in future work, therefore, is to add dynamic features to the instantiated
model in the form of variables and operations that model the behaviour of the entities
in the domain and to animate this behaviour so that the instantiated requirements can be
validated. The ultimate goal is to specify this behaviour in the generic model in order
to maximize reuse at the instantiation stage.
During the domain analysis phase we found that considering the rationale for re-
quirements revealed key issues, which are properties that an instantiated model should
possess. Key issues are higher level requirements that could be expressed at a more ab-
stract level from which the generic model is a reﬁnement. The generic model could then
be veriﬁed to satisfy the key issue properties by proof or model checking. This matter
is considered in [25] which gives an example of reﬁnement of UML-B models in the
failure management domain.
The ﬁnal stage is to validate a speciﬁc, instantiated conﬁguration. This would be
done by providing actual values to generic behaviours when the generic model is instan-
tiated. The resulting speciﬁc model could then be animated to validate its behaviour.
Finally, we recognize the need for tools to support uploading of bulk system in-
stance deﬁnition data, as well as the efﬁcient and user-friendly validation/ debugging
of said data. The Requirements Manager prototype provides database storage and some
validation; ProB could easily be enhanced to provide, for example, data counterexam-
ples explaining invariant violations.4 Domain Analysis
Domain analysis such as used by Lam [16] is the study of the application domain,
with domain specialists, with the intention of capturing its characteristics, processes
and requirements in textual and diagrammatic form. The ﬁrst step was to deﬁne the
scope of the domain in discussion with engine controller experts. An early synthesis of
the requirements and key issues were formed, giving due attention to the rationale for
the requirements. Considering the requirements rationale is useful in reasoning about
requirementsinthedomain[Op.Cit.].Forexample,therationaleforconﬁrmingafailure
before taking action is that the system should not be generate false positive failure
results from transient interference on its inputs. From the consideration of requirements
rationale, key issues were identiﬁed which served as higher level properties required of
thesystem.Anexampleofsuchapropertywouldbethatthefailuremanagementsystem
must not be held in a transient action state indeﬁnitely. The rationale from which it has
been derived is that a transient state is temporary and actions associated with this state
may only be valid for a limited time.
A core set of requirements were identiﬁed from several representative failure man-
agement engine systems. For example, the identiﬁcation of magnitude tests with vari-
able limits and associated conditions established several magnitude test types; these
types have been further subsumed into a general detection type. This type structure
provided a taxonomy for classiﬁcation of the requirements.
Domain analysis showed that failure management systems are characterised by a
high degree of fairly simple similar units made complex by a large number of minor
variations and interdependencies. The domain presents opportunities for a high degree
of reuse within a single product as well as between products. For example, a magnitude
testisusuallyrequiredin anumberof instancesina particularsystem.Thisis incontrast
to the engine start domain addressed by Lam [16], where a single instance of each
reusable function exists in a particular product. Our method is targeted at domains such
as failure management where a few simple units are reused many times and a particular
conﬁguration depends on the relationships between the instances of these simple units.
A ﬁrst-cut entity relationship model was constructed from the units identiﬁed during
the domain analysis stage. The entities identiﬁed during domain analysis were:
– INP Identiﬁcation of an input sensor and its characteristics to be tested
– CONDConditionunderwhichatestisperformedoranactionistaken.(Apredicate
based on the values and/or failure states of other inputs)
– DET Detection of a failure state. A predicate that compares the value of an expres-
sion to be tested against a limit value. There are specialized versions of detection,
e.g. DET MAG for magnitude tests and DET RATE for rate-of-change tests
– CONF Conﬁrmation of a failure state. An iterative algorithm performed for each
invocation of a detection, used to establish whether a detected failure state is gen-
uine or transitory
– ACT Action taken either normally or in response to a failure, possibly subject to
a condition. Assigns the value of an expression, which may involve inputs and/or
other output values, to an output
– OUT Identiﬁcation of an output to be used by an actionFigure 2 shows the ﬁnal class diagram resulting from this early entity-relationship
model of generic requirements.
5 Domain Engineering
The aim of the domain engineering stage is to explore, develop and validate the ﬁrst-
cut generic model of the requirements into a validated generic model, using suitable
technology. At this stage this is essentially an entity relationship model, omitting any
behaviours (except temporary ones added for validation purposes). The model indi-
cates the necessary and permitted conﬁgurations of the various functional requirements
without detailing the behaviour involved in those requirements. For example, that there
must be one conﬁrmation mechanism for each input and that a conﬁguration must have
at least one detection mechanism.
The ﬁrst-cut model from the domain analysis stage was converted to the UML-B
notation(Fig.2)byaddingstereotypesandUML-Bclauses(taggedvalues)asdeﬁnedin
theUML-Bproﬁle[26].ThisallowsthemodeltobeconvertedintotheBnotationwhere
validation and veriﬁcation tools are available. The model contains invariant properties,
which constrain the associations, and ensures that every instance is a member of its
class. As well as these diagrammatic invariants, additional textual invariants may be
added where the diagram notation is unable to express constraints. For example, the
invariant in Fig. 2 expresses the fact that every action (instance of class ACT) must be
linked at least once to a conﬁrmation (instance of class CONF) via one of the three
associations, hAct, pAct and tAct. To validate the model we needed to be able
to build up the instances it holds in steps. For this stage a constructor was added to
each class so that the model could be populated with instances. The constructor was
deﬁned to set any associations belonging to that class according to values supplied as
parameters.
The model was tested by adding example instances using the animation facility of
ProB and examining the values of the B variables representing the classes and associa-
tions in the model to see that they developed as expected. ProB provides an indicator to
show when the invariant is violated. Due to the ‘required’ (i.e. multiplicity greater than
0) constraints in our model, the only way to populate it without violating the invariant
would be to add instances of several classes simultaneously. However, we found that
observing the invariant violations was a useful part of the feedback during validation of
the model. Knowing that the model recognises inconsistent states, is just as important as
knowing that it accepts consistent ones. The model was rearranged substantially during
this phase as the animation revealed problems. Once we were satisﬁed that the model
was suitable, we removed the constructor operations to simplify the corresponding B
model for the next stage.
The next stage is to add behaviour to the generic model by giving the classes opera-
tions. In future work we will investigate the best way to introduce this behaviour during
the process. It may be possible to add the behaviour after the static model has been
validated as described above. Alternatively, perhaps the behaviour will affect the static
structure and should be added earlier. In either case, we aim to formalise the rationale
described in the domain analysis and derive the behaviour as a reﬁnement from this.OUT
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Fig.2. Final UML-B version of generic model of failure management requirements
6 Requirements for a speciﬁc application
Having arrived at a useful model we then use it to specify the requirements for an in-
stance application by populating it with instance requirements for each of the generic
requirement classes. For a particular application, the instances are not created and de-
stroyed dynamically but are deﬁned as a static conﬁguration consistent with the generic
model. Thus we do not use constructors to populate the model; we deﬁne each class to
have a ﬁxed set of instances.
At ﬁrst we used ProB to check the application is consistent with the properties ex-
pressed in the generic model. This veriﬁcation is a similar process to the previous val-
idation but the focus is on possible errors in the instantiation rather than in the model.
The application is ﬁrst described in tabular form. The generic model provides a template
for the construction of the tables. Each class is represented by a separate table; foreign
key links represent the associations owned by that class. The tabular form is useful as
documentation of the application but is not directly useful for veriﬁcation. To verify its
consistency, the tabular form is translated into class instance enumerations and associa-
tion initialisation clauses attached to the UML-B class model. We found that doing this
manually was tedious and error prone. Therefore we automated the translation by im-
plementing a ‘Requirements Manager’ tool. The tool was developed as an IBM eclipse
plug-in by a student group4. The Requirements Manager (RM) tool loads application
4 See acknowledgementsconﬁguration data from an Excel ﬁle and populates the relevant ﬁelds in the UML-B
class model.
Initially, we used ProB to check which conjuncts of the invariant are violated. For
our FDM example, several iterations were necessary to eliminate errors in the tables
before the invariant was satisﬁed. The ProB ‘analyse invariant’ facility provides infor-
mation about which conjuncts of the invariant are violated but, in a data intensive model
such as this, it is still not easy to see which part of the data is at fault. It would be useful
to show a data counterexample to the conjunct (analogous to an event sequence coun-
terexample in model checking). The RM tool veriﬁes the application data against the
class structure and association constraints of the UML-B class model, when that data is
ﬁrst loaded into the database. RM then reports any violations, identifying the speciﬁc
data that caused the violation. Figure 3 is a screenshot of the RM tool in use, showing
the generic requirements structure in two views, and two detail views (on lower right)
of data veriﬁcation errors. Note that a limitation of the tool (inherited from its underly-
ing database representation) is that many to many associations cannot be represented.
This is circumvented by inserting an intermediate class into the association (e.g. HACT,
PACT and TACT). The RM tool is described in more detail in [28].
Fig.3. Screenshot of Requirements Manager being used to populate the generic model7 Classiﬁcation of problems
It is useful to classify the kinds of problems found during animation and veriﬁcation in
order to better understand the source of problems and improve the requirements engi-
neering process. So far, we have found that problems can be classiﬁed on a methodolog-
ical stage basis. Possible categories on this basis, some of which we have experienced,
are as follows.
– Veriﬁcation of generic model - the generic model is inconsistent or incorrect
– Validation of generic model - the generic model is correct and consistent but does
not reﬂect the generic requirements
– Validation of generic requirement - the generic model works as expected but ani-
mation leads expert to review generic requirements
– Veriﬁcationofinstantiation-theinstantiationisinconsistentwiththegenericmodel
because of an incorrect instantiation
– Veriﬁcation of instantiation (generic model) - the instantiation is inconsistent with
the generic model because the generic model is inadequate
– Validation of instantiation - the instantiation is consistent with the generic model
but does not reﬂect the speciﬁc requirements
– Validation of speciﬁc requirements - the instantiation is consistent with the generic
model but animation leads expert to review speciﬁc requirements
In the future, when behavioural features are modelled, we expect to ﬁnd other ways
of classifying problems. For example we may be able to distinguish functional areas
that are prone to incorrect speciﬁcation.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed a formal, object-oriented approach to the rigorous engi-
neering, validation and veriﬁcation of generic requirements for a product line of critical
systems.Ourcasestudyisinthedomainoffailuremanagementanddetectionforengine
control. The approach can be generalised to any relatively complex system component
whererepetitionsofsimilarunitsindicateanopportunityforparameterisedreusebutthe
extent of differences and interrelations between units makes this non-trivial to achieve.
The product-line approach to application instance production amortises the effort in-
volved in formal validation and veriﬁcation over many instances. So far we have con-
sidered the static entity-relationship, or class-association aspects of the requirements.
In future work we aim to extend the approach to consider also the detailed meaning (i.e.
dynamic behaviour) of these classes of requirements.
We have also undertaken a pilot study on a small subset of the requirements, i.e. the
dual redundant engine speed functionality ESa and ESb. This exercise had a number
of aims: (i) to support the domain analysis at a level of ﬁne detail, (ii) to gain an early
view of appropriate design abstractions, (iii) for a B novice to gain experience in the
B method and tools, (iv) and to evaluate the usability and utility of method and tools.
In particular, the novice engineer’s independent development of an approach to reﬁne-
ment by what we have called ‘idealisation’ and ‘de-idealisation’ may be a promisingmethodological contribution. Thus invaluable input has been provided to the ongoing
exercise of developing the new Event-B method and tools.
Two broad areas of future work are indicated by the case study, both linking to
related work on Product Line Engineering (PLE). The ﬁrst concerns instance data man-
agement, the second variability vs. commonality in the generic model.
For a product family such as FDM at ATEC as currently envisaged, instance data
management is in principle straightforward. This is because no system instance/variant
requirements are deﬁned at the generic level - all structure and behaviour is speciﬁed in
terms of a single generic model. Instance/variant requirements are captured completely
by instance-level data. This means that all instance data structures are deﬁned in terms
of the generic class deﬁnitions. Therefore, the data for a system instance is simply
deﬁned as a subset of the database of all required instance speciﬁcations; tooling is
thus a straightforward database application, as we have demonstrated with our new
Requirements Manager tool.
Instance management becomes more complex when variability is required in the
generic model. This is the usual state of affairs in PLE. The mobile phone scenario of
[20] is typical, where each system instance is deﬁned by a distinct set of functional
features, aimed at a speciﬁc market segment and target price. We might deﬁne a feature
to be a small coherent group of requirements respresenting some system goal; examples
in telephony include CH (call hold), CD (caller divert), CC (conference call). Features
are not in general simply composable, and the totality of features cannot in general be
speciﬁedinonegenericmodel:variabilityspeciﬁcationisrequiredinthegenericmodel.
To date approaches to this (such as [20]) have been in the obvious syntactic form: in
ATEC for example, variants on the generic model for other engine manufacturers might
be described as extra colour-coded classes, associations, states, events etc. A system
variant (or sub-family) would thus be deﬁned in terms of some colour-combination
submodel. A more sophisticated metamodelling approach to variability speciﬁcation,
based on the Model-Driven Architecture of the OMG, has recently been proposed [21].
Future work will investigate developing such variability and tooling issues in the
ATEC context, using the UML-B and reﬁnement approaches and the RM tool discussed
in this paper. The application of reﬁnement approaches to PLE to date has been modest,
e.g. [6, 30], and has, in our view, much potential. An obvious unit for modelling vari-
abilities is the feature. Investigations are ongoing into the development of reﬁnement
decomposition and generic instantiation in Event-B, and their deployment on variability
speciﬁcation via features. Retrenchment, a generalizing theory for reﬁnement, has been
investigated in a feature engineering context [5], and may well also be useful in PLE.
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